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2.
J Public Health Manag Pract ; 28(6): 607-614, 2022.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-2107678

ABSTRACT

CONTEXT: The ability to diagnose and screen for infection is an important component of the US COVID-19 response and is facilitated by public health laboratories (PHLs). Anecdotal media reports and limited case studies have described some of the challenges faced by PHLs during the pandemic, particularly initial challenges related to developing and deploying tests to PHLs, but there has not been a systematic evaluation of the experience of PHLs during the pandemic. OBJECTIVE: To document challenges and lessons learned experienced by local and state PHLs during the COVID-19 pandemic to support generation of best practices for current and future similar emergencies. DESIGN, SETTING, AND PARTICIPANTS: From February to June 2021, researchers conducted 24 interviews with 68 leaders and staff representing 28 local and state PHLs across 27 states. Thematic analysis of interview content documented operational challenges and any identified solutions or preventive measures used or proposed. MAIN OUTCOME MEASURES: Analysis identified the following themes regarding challenges faced among PHLs: strategic decision making and determining the mandate of the PHL; political interference by jurisdictional leadership; federal mismanagement of the emergency; regulatory challenges; managing partnerships with other laboratories; acquisition of appropriate supplies; insufficient information systems; acquiring and retaining workforce; and difficulty accessing sufficient funding. RESULTS: Within the identified themes, key informants provided further elaboration regarding how PHLs experienced, evaded, or solved these challenges. In addition, PHLs described how challenges evolved throughout the course of the COVID-19 pandemic and made proposals regarding how challenges could be prevented or further addressed in the future by laboratories or other decision makers and stakeholders. CONCLUSIONS: While fellow laboratories and political leadership may gain inspiration from creative solutions employed by PHLs, recognition of long-standing gaps related to funding, laboratory workforce, and consideration of laboratory needs in preparedness policies must be addressed for future large-scale outbreaks.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Laboratories , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19/prevention & control , Humans , Pandemics/prevention & control , Public Health , United States/epidemiology , United States Public Health Service
3.
American Journal of Public Health ; 112(8):1161-1169, 2022.
Article in English | CINAHL | ID: covidwho-1939845

ABSTRACT

Objectives. To collect and standardize COVID-19 demographic data published by local public-facing Web sites and analyze how this information differs from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) public surveillance data. Methods. We aggregated and standardized COVID-19 data on cases and deaths by age, gender, race, and ethnicity from US state and territorial governmental sources between May 24 and June 4, 2021. We describe the standardization process and compare it with the CDC's process for public surveillance data. Results. As of June 2021, the CDC's public demographic data set included 80.9% of total cases and 46.7% of total deaths reported by states, with significant variation across jurisdictions. Relative to state and territorial data sources, the CDC consistently underreports cases and deaths among African American and Hispanic or Latino individuals and overreports deaths among people older than 65 years and White individuals. Conclusions. Differences exist in amounts of data included and demographic composition between the CDC's public surveillance data and state and territory reporting, with large heterogeneity across jurisdictions. A lack of standardization and reporting mechanisms limits the production of complete real-time demographic data.

4.
J Public Health Manag Pract ; 28(4): 330-333, 2022.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1901306

ABSTRACT

Racial and ethnic minorities in the United States have been disproportionately affected by the COVID-19 pandemic, experiencing increased risk of infection, hospitalization, and death. In this study, we sought to examine race- and ethnicity-based differences in SARS-CoV-2 testing. We used publicly available US state dashboards to extract demographic data for COVID-19 cases and tests. Poisson regression models were used to model the effect of race and ethnicity on the number of SARS-CoV-2 tests performed per case. In total, just 8 states reported testing data by race and ethnicity. In regression models, race and ethnicity was a significant predictor of testing rate per case. In all states, Hispanic/Latino patients had a significantly lower testing rate than their non-Hispanic/Latino counterparts, with an incident rate ratio varying from 0.45 to 0.81, depending on the state and referent race category. These results suggest disparities in testing access among Hispanic/Latino individuals, who are already at a disproportionate risk for infection and severe outcomes.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , SARS-CoV-2 , COVID-19/diagnosis , COVID-19/epidemiology , COVID-19 Testing , Health Status Disparities , Hispanic or Latino , Humans , Pandemics , United States/epidemiology
5.
Health Secur ; 20(2): 116-126, 2022.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1806223

ABSTRACT

Veterinary and animal care workers perform critical functions in biosecurity and public health, yet little has been done to understand the unique needs and barriers these workers face when responding during a pandemic crisis. In this article, we evaluated the perceived risks and roles of veterinary and animal care workers during the COVID-19 pandemic and explored barriers and facilitators in their readiness, ability, and willingness to respond during a pandemic. We deployed a survey targeting US veterinary medical personnel, animal shelter and control workers, zoo and wildlife workers, and other animal care workers. Data were collected on respondents' self-reported job and demographic factors, perceptions of risk and job efficacy, and readiness, ability, and willingness to respond during the pandemic. We found that leadership roles and older age had the strongest association with decreased perceived risk and improved job efficacy and confidence, and that increased reported contact level with others (both coworkers and the public) was associated with increased perceived risk. We determined that older age and serving in leadership positions were associated with improved readiness, willingness, and ability to respond. Veterinary and animal care workers' dedication to public health response, reflected in our findings, will be imperative if more zoonotic vectors of SARS-CoV-2 arise. Response preparedness in veterinary and animal care workers can be improved by targeting younger workers not in leadership roles through support programs that focus on improving job efficacy and confidence in safety protocols. These findings can be used to target intervention and training efforts to support the most vulnerable within this critical, yet often overlooked, workforce.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Animals , Health Personnel , Humans , Pandemics/prevention & control , Perception , SARS-CoV-2
8.
BMJ Glob Health ; 6(12)2021 12.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1566363

ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION: The Global Health Security Index benchmarks countries' capacities to carry out the functions necessary to prevent, detect and respond to biological threats. The COVID-19 pandemic served as an opportunity to evaluate whether the Index contained the correct array of variables that influence countries' abilities to respond to these threats; assess additional variables that may influence preparedness; and examine how the impact of preparedness components change during public health crises. METHODS: Linear regression models were examined to determine the relationship between excess mortality per capita for the first 500 days of countries' COVID-19 pandemic and internal Index variables, as well as external variables including social cohesion; island status; perceived corruption; elderly population size; previous epidemic experience; stringency of non-pharmaceutical interventions; and social and political polarisation. RESULTS: COVID-19 outcomes were significantly associated with sociodemographic, political and governance variables external to the 2019 Index: social cohesion, reduction in social polarisation and reduced perceptions of corruption were consistently correlated with reduced excess mortality throughout the pandemic. The association of other variables assessed by the Index, like epidemiological workforce robustness, changed over time. Fixed country features, including geographic connectedness, larger elderly population and lack of prior coronavirus outbreak experience were detrimental to COVID-19 outcomes. Finally, there was evidence that countries that lacked certain capacities were able to develop these over the course of the pandemic. CONCLUSIONS: Additional sociodemographic, political and governance variables should be included in future indices to improve their ability to characterise preparedness. Fixed characteristics, while not directly addressable, are useful for establishing countries' inherent risk profile and can motivate those at greater risk to invest in preparedness. Particular components of preparedness vary in their impact on outcomes over the course of the pandemic, which may inform resource direction during ongoing crises. Future research should seek to further characterise time-dependent impacts as additional COVID-19 outcome data become available.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Aged , Global Health , Humans , Pandemics/prevention & control , SARS-CoV-2 , Social Cohesion
10.
J Infect Dis ; 224(6): 938-948, 2021 09 17.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1429242

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: With multiple coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) vaccines available, understanding the epidemiologic, clinical, and economic value of increasing coverage levels and expediting vaccination is important. METHODS: We developed a computational model (transmission and age-stratified clinical and economics outcome model) representing the United States population, COVID-19 coronavirus spread (February 2020-December 2022), and vaccination to determine the impact of increasing coverage and expediting time to achieve coverage. RESULTS: When achieving a given vaccination coverage in 270 days (70% vaccine efficacy), every 1% increase in coverage can avert an average of 876 800 (217 000-2 398 000) cases, varying with the number of people already vaccinated. For example, each 1% increase between 40% and 50% coverage can prevent 1.5 million cases, 56 240 hospitalizations, and 6660 deaths; gain 77 590 quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs); and save $602.8 million in direct medical costs and $1.3 billion in productivity losses. Expediting to 180 days could save an additional 5.8 million cases, 215 790 hospitalizations, 26 370 deaths, 206 520 QALYs, $3.5 billion in direct medical costs, and $4.3 billion in productivity losses. CONCLUSIONS: Our study quantifies the potential value of decreasing vaccine hesitancy and increasing vaccination coverage and how this value may decrease with the time it takes to achieve coverage, emphasizing the need to reach high coverage levels as soon as possible, especially before the fall/winter.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 Vaccines/economics , Cost-Benefit Analysis , Vaccination/economics , COVID-19/prevention & control , COVID-19 Vaccines/administration & dosage , Humans , Models, Economic , SARS-CoV-2 , United States , Vaccination/statistics & numerical data
11.
Ann Intern Med ; 174(7): 1014-1015, 2021 07.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1384006
12.
BMC Public Health ; 21(1): 620, 2021 04 13.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1264157

ABSTRACT

BACKGROUND: To understand operational challenges involved with responding to US measles outbreaks in 2017-19 and identify applicable lessons in order to inform preparedness and response operations for future outbreaks, particularly with respect to specific operational barriers and recommendations for outbreak responses among insular communities. METHODS: From August 2019 to January 2020, we conducted 11 telephone interviews with 18 participants representing state and local health departments and community health centers that responded to US measles outbreaks in 2017-19, with a focus on outbreaks among insular communities. We conducted qualitative, thematic coding to identify and characterize key operational challenges and lessons identified by the interviewees. RESULTS: We categorized principal insights into 5 topic areas: scale of the response, vaccination operations, exclusion policies, community engagement, and countering anti-vaccine efforts. These topics address resource-intensive aspects of these outbreak responses, including personnel demands; guidance needed to support response operations and reduce transmission, such as excluding exposed or at-risk individuals from public spaces; operational challenges and barriers to vaccination and other response activities; and effectively engaging and educating affected populations, particularly with respect to insular and vulnerable communities. CONCLUSIONS: Measles outbreak responses are resource intensive, which can quickly overwhelm existing public health capacities. Early and effective coordination with trusted leaders and organizations in affected communities, including to provide vaccination capacity and facilitate community engagement, can promote efficient response operations. The firsthand experiences of public health and healthcare personnel who responded to measles outbreaks, including among insular communities, provide evidence-based operational lessons that can inform future preparedness and response operations for outbreaks of highly transmissible diseases.


Subject(s)
Epidemics , Measles , Disease Outbreaks/prevention & control , Humans , Measles/epidemiology , Measles/prevention & control , Measles Vaccine , Public Health , Vaccination
13.
Health Secur ; 18(6): 473-482, 2020 Dec.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-1217794

ABSTRACT

Mass vaccination is a crucial public health intervention during outbreaks or pandemics for which vaccines are available. The US government has sponsored the development of medical countermeasures, including vaccines, for public health emergencies; however, federally supported programs, including the Public Health and Emergency Preparedness program and Cities Readiness Initiative, have historically emphasized antibiotic pill dispensing over mass vaccination. While mass vaccination and pill dispensing programs share similarities, they also have fundamental differences that require dedicated preparedness efforts to address. To date, only a limited number of public assessments of local mass vaccination operational capabilities have been conducted. To fill this gap, we interviewed 37 public health and preparedness officials representing 33 jurisdictions across the United States. We aimed to characterize their existing mass vaccination operational capacities and identify challenges and lessons learned in order to support the efforts of other jurisdictions to improve mass vaccination preparedness. We found that most jurisdictions were not capable of or had not planned for rapidly vaccinating their populations within a short period of time (eg, 1 to 2 weeks). Many also noted that their focus on pill dispensing was driven largely by federal funding requirements and that preparedness efforts for mass vaccination were often self-motivated. Barriers to implementing rapid mass vaccination operations included insufficient personnel qualified to administer vaccinations, increased patient load compared to pill-dispensing modalities, logistical challenges to maintaining cold chain, and operational challenges addressing high-risk populations, including children, pregnant women, and non-English-speaking populations. Considering the expected availability of a severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 vaccine for distribution and dispensing to the public, our findings highlight critical considerations for planning possible future mass vaccination events, including during the novel coronavirus disease 2019 pandemic.


Subject(s)
COVID-19 , Civil Defense/trends , Mass Vaccination/trends , Medical Countermeasures , Public Health , Vulnerable Populations/ethnology , Disaster Planning/trends , Humans , Mass Vaccination/organization & administration , Vaccination
14.
BMJ Glob Health ; 5(10)2020 10.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-841420

ABSTRACT

Infectious disease outbreaks pose major threats to human health and security. Countries with robust capacities for preventing, detecting and responding to outbreaks can avert many of the social, political, economic and health system costs of such crises. The Global Health Security Index (GHS Index)-the first comprehensive assessment and benchmarking of health security and related capabilities across 195 countries-recently found that no country is sufficiently prepared for epidemics or pandemics. The GHS Index can help health security stakeholders identify areas of weakness, as well as opportunities to collaborate across sectors, collectively strengthen health systems and achieve shared public health goals. Some scholars have recently offered constructive critiques of the GHS Index's approach to scoring and ranking countries; its weighting of select indicators; its emphasis on transparency; its focus on biosecurity and biosafety capacities; and divergence between select country scores and corresponding COVID-19-associated caseloads, morbidity, and mortality. Here, we (1) describe the practical value of the GHS Index; (2) present potential use cases to help policymakers and practitioners maximise the utility of the tool; (3) discuss the importance of scoring and ranking; (4) describe the robust methodology underpinning country scores and ranks; (5) highlight the GHS Index's emphasis on transparency and (6) articulate caveats for users wishing to use GHS Index data in health security research, policymaking and practice.


Subject(s)
Global Health , Security Measures/organization & administration , Benchmarking/organization & administration , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Coronavirus Infections/epidemiology , Coronavirus Infections/mortality , Coronavirus Infections/prevention & control , Humans , Leadership , Pandemics/prevention & control , Pneumonia, Viral/epidemiology , Pneumonia, Viral/mortality , Pneumonia, Viral/prevention & control , SARS-CoV-2
16.
BMJ Glob Health ; 5(8)2020 08.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-696273

ABSTRACT

Recent infectious disease outbreaks, including the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic and Ebola in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, have demonstrated the critical importance of resilient health systems in safeguarding global health security. Importantly, the human, economic and political tolls of these crises are being amplified by health systems' inabilities to respond quickly and effectively. Improving resilience within health systems can build on pre-existing strengths to enhance the readiness of health system actors to respond to crises, while also maintaining core functions. Using data gathered from a scoping literature review, interviews with key informants and from stakeholders who attended a workshop held in Dhaka, Bangladesh, we developed a Health System Resilience Checklist ('the checklist'). The aim of the checklist is to measure the specific capacities, capabilities and processes that health systems need in order to ensure resilience in the face of both infectious disease outbreaks and natural hazards. The checklist is intended to be adapted and used in a broad set of countries as a component of ongoing processes to ensure that health actors, institutions and populations can mount an effective response to infectious disease outbreaks and natural hazards while also maintaining core healthcare services. The checklist is an important first step in improving health system resilience to these threats, but additional research and resources will be necessary to further refine and prioritise the checklist items and to pilot the checklist with the frontline health facilities that would be using it. This will help ensure its feasibility and durability for the long-term within the health systems strengthening and health security fields.


Subject(s)
Checklist , Delivery of Health Care , Disease Outbreaks , Global Health , Health Priorities , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Coronavirus Infections , Disaster Planning , Hemorrhagic Fever, Ebola , Humans , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral , SARS-CoV-2
17.
BMJ Glob Health ; 5(6)2020 06.
Article in English | MEDLINE | ID: covidwho-603208

ABSTRACT

INTRODUCTION: Nine events have been assessed for potential declaration of a Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC). A PHEIC is defined as an extraordinary event that constitutes a public health risk to other states through international spread and requires a coordinated international response. The WHO Director-General convenes Emergency Committees (ECs) to provide their advice on whether an event constitutes a PHEIC. The EC rationales have been criticised for being non-transparent and contradictory to the International Health Regulations (IHR). This first comprehensive analysis of EC rationale provides recommendations to increase clarity of EC decisions which will strengthen the IHR and WHO's legitimacy in future outbreaks. METHODS: 66 EC statements were reviewed from nine public health outbreaks of influenza A, Middle East respiratory syndrome coronavirus, polio, Ebola virus disease, Zika, yellow fever and coronavirus disease-2019. Statements were analysed to determine which of the three IHR criteria were noted as contributing towards the EC's justification on whether to declare a PHEIC and what language was used to explain the decision. RESULTS: Interpretation of the criteria were often vague and applied inconsistently. ECs often failed to describe and justify which criteria had been satisfied. DISCUSSION: Guidelines must be developed for the standardised interpretation of IHR core criteria. The ECs must clearly identify and justify which criteria have contributed to their rationale for or against PHEIC declaration. CONCLUSION: Striving for more consistency and transparency in EC justifications would benefit future deliberations and provide more understanding and support for the process.


Subject(s)
Coronavirus Infections , Disaster Planning , Emergencies , International Health Regulations , Pandemics , Pneumonia, Viral , Public Health/legislation & jurisprudence , Betacoronavirus , COVID-19 , Global Health , Humans , International Cooperation , SARS-CoV-2 , Virus Diseases
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